



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 38 NUMBER 3

What Is Nasser Like?

by Richard D. Robinson

Now that United Nations Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld has returned from his Middle East mission, we ask ourselves again, What are Nasser's objectives?

Many Americans believe that President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, who came to power in 1954, is just another tin-horn dictator and self-seeking opportunist. Others contend that he strives toward constructive ends with which the West should be identified.

Motivation and goals are difficult to judge, even in face-to-face contact with individuals of one's own nation. We can go only by the record. In so doing, we must assume a man innocent of evil intent until proved guilty.

In the case of Nasser, evil cannot be equated simply with anti-Western or neutralist thought and action. What we must prove is that he is acting contrary to the interests and welfare of the Arab peoples. And in making such a judgment we must measure existing regimes, not against an ideal that may not be attainable, but against possible alternatives—in the case of Egypt probably either a Communist takeover or the recurrence of religious fanaticism.

President Nasser is one of the first of the modern Arab leaders to face up in a realistic

way to such problems as land reform, industrial development, honesty in government, mass education, and so on. It is too early to judge results, but programs of social and economic development are Nasser's stock in trade. A large part of his popularity in the Middle East is due primarily to his closer identification with genuine social and economic reform than is true of other contemporary Arab leaders.

Virtually every Western student of Middle Eastern affairs agrees that the prime prerequisites for really significant economic development of the Arab states are some kind of regional union and an honest, reform-minded government. About half of the population of the Arab Middle East—that of Egypt—is now confined to 35,168 square kilometers in the Nile Valley, with virtually no oil. And much of the wealth in the balance of the Middle East is concentrated in a few hands.

Given the mutual jealousy and the tenacity with which the various competing monarchs, sheiks and other petty Arab politicians protect their privileged positions, it is unrealistic to expect the achievement of Arab unity within the foreseeable future without some violence.

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Many of these Arab leaders have shown callous disregard for the welfare of their own peoples until hustled into belated and half-hearted reform through fear of either Nasserism or communism, or both. Actually the record shows that, as great revolutions go, Nasser-led Arab nationalism has been remarkably free of violence. And Nasser himself has repeatedly expressed personal repugnance for violence, which he regards as self-defeating in many situations.

An obvious precondition for instituting regional unity and honest reform government is a generally recognized, forceful leader. Nasser comes the closest to filling this role.

Under these circumstances, Western moves to keep the Arabs divided among and against themselves have in fact blocked the general development of the area. So also have any Western moves to shore up disliked, opportunistic and corrupt regimes—often created in the first instance by the Western powers. Not even the Western press can make such regimes, now under attack, locally popular.

Nasser's Record

Many American editorial writers and others charge that Nasser's "positive neutrality" is nothing but a sham, just another word for destructive nationalism and political opportunism. It is true that in any mass movement there are destructive elements. But let us look at the other side of the record.

The Suez Canal has been kept open by the Egyptians and not used for political blackmail, as many had

feared at the time of nationalization. The Egyptians on July 13 accepted a mutually satisfactory agreement with foreign stockholders on compensation for the canal—yet many Westerners had said that this could never take place. And little known to the American public is the fact that, after nationalization, Nasser invited a group of American business interests to operate the canal.

None of the Nasser-oriented states—Egypt, Syria, Iraq—tolerate a domestic Communist movement. None of these states have stopped the flow of oil to the West. And it was only Syria's union with Egypt under the protective mantle of the United Arab Republic (UAR) which halted Syria's drift into the Soviet orbit. On several occasions Nasser applied to the West first for military and economic assistance, and in every instance he took precautions to avoid direct Soviet intervention in the Middle East. So far Nasser gives no indication of being a Soviet tool or of being directly responsible for revolution in Iraq or unrest in Lebanon.

The mere evidence that the Lebanese rebels received some UAR assistance does not transform Lebanese unrest from civil war into aggression. So far no evidence of massive UAR aid to the Lebanese rebels has been presented, according to the United Nations Observation Group.

One further point should be borne in mind. It is misleading to measure the Egyptian regime by the yardstick of Western democracy. The adoption of democracy in Egypt now would merely condemn the country to the

return of a corrupt, self-serving, Farouk-like regime. Today the social, educational and economic level of Egypt is not adequate to support a democracy. Just as Kemal Atatürk's dictatorship (1923-1938) prepared Turkey for a limited form of democracy, so perhaps Nasser's authoritarian regime will prepare Egypt for eventual democratization. But much has to be done before that time arrives. It took Turkey 26 years to modernize its society, and even today democracy is still seriously challenged there—not by self-seeking politicians but by the still considerable weakness of the economic, educational and social systems. For democracy requires at least a minimum of popular enlightenment and some economic strength.

It would be well for Americans to withhold judgment until all the evidence is in—and that may be some years away. Is Nasser another Atatürk, or isn't he? No one now knows, for power can corrupt. But it need not—as witness Atatürk. In passing final judgment we must bear in mind that Atatürk had two advantages over Nasser—an economically viable country and a relatively homogeneous people. And, strange to recall, in the early days of the Atatürk revolution, Turkey's only external assistance came from the Soviet Union.

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(A different view of Nasser will be presented in a future article.)

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Tug of War of Two Chinas

Was our test of brinkmanship over the Chinese offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu necessary?

The answers to this question that one gets both here in Washington and around the country range from an emphatic "yes" to a vehement "no." On no other foreign policy issue since World War II, it seems safe to say, has disagreement been so vocal, so violent and so bipartisan.

President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, (who is as much author as executor of this policy), say emphatically "yes." They are supported by former President Harry S. Truman. Mr. Truman does not try to justify the conduct of affairs that brought the United States to the brink in the Formosa Strait, but he contends that now that the country is there "we must meet the challenge resolutely, swiftly and as a united people," not giving in to Communist bluster, threat or force.

The most vocal critic of this policy which has ended in putting Quemoy and Matsu within America's "defense perimeter" is former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who in a statement issued in Washington on September 6 called this decision "horrendous." He asserts the islands are "not worth a single American life." The critics of Administration Formosan policy also include most of America's allies — notably Britain, France and Canada—the noncommitted world and many of our intellectual and political leaders.

Republican Senators generally applaud the offshore island policy, with Senator William H. Knowland of California and the so-called China Lobby in the lead. But Republican Senator John Sherman Cooper of

Kentucky has expressed public doubt about the value of the offshore islands. And Adlai E. Stevenson, while describing the conduct of foreign policy in recent years as "clumsy, erratic and self-righteous," recognizes the country's "solemn obligation" to defend Formosa—and the offshore islands in the process if necessary. Among the more outspoken Democratic critics are Governor Averell Harriman of New York, Senators Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota, Wayne Morse of Oregon, J. W. Fulbright of Arkansas and John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts.

Chinese Deadlock

There is no doubt that the Administration's decision to defend Quemoy and Matsu has mystified Washington observers more than any other policy we have followed since 1945. It is assumed here that Mr. Dulles must have known what had been going on in the offshore islands during the past three years, since the last Quemoy crisis of 1955. But if he knew that Chiang Kai-shek was committing a third of his troops, or about 90,000 men, to this outpost, which is five miles from the China mainland, and by so doing was deliberately tying Quemoy's defense to that of Formosa, neither the American public nor the press was aware of what was happening, or of its implications.

The crisis in the Formosa Strait arises from the fact that Nationalist China is committed to holding on to the offshore islands as well as to Formosa and the Pescadores, and Communist China is committed to acquiring them. Peiping is quite willing to acquire the islands by peaceful means, but if the Nationalists will

not give them up, then they want to take them by blockade, by intrigue or by force.

Talk of neutralizing the offshore islands sounds reasonable to many non-Chinese, but it is unacceptable to either Peiping or Taiwan. The possibility of neutralization provides a topic for discussion by the American and Chinese Communist ambassadors at Warsaw; but if anything is to come of it the United States will have to pressure Chiang Kai-shek into accepting neutralization, and Moscow may have to persuade Peiping to be equally reasonable. Recent events, however, indicate little inclination on the part of either Chiang or Mao Tse-tung to take direction from their respective senior partners.

Yet important as is the question of how the Quemoy crisis arose, the more immediately important question is, How to resolve it peacefully? The ambassadorial talks in Warsaw which opened on September 15 are directed to that end.

But if Chiang approves neutralization of the offshore islands he will have to renounce his goal of returning to the mainland, and the maintenance of Nationalist troops on the offshore islands becomes superfluous. And if Mao accepts such a program he faces the prospect of never attaining his territorial goals which, it is believed, include the taking over of Formosa. It is true that Mr. Dulles has hinted at accommodations if Peiping is diplomatically reasonable. But Mr. Dulles may find it as hard, if not harder, to sell any changes in the *status quo* to our ally, Nationalist China, as to negotiate them with the Chinese Communists.

NEAL STANFORD



What Should U.S. Do About China?

Views of John Foster Dulles

The following is excerpted from the text of the statement made by the Secretary of State at Newport, R.I., on September 4, as reported in *The New York Times* of September 5.

I HAVE reviewed in detail with the President the serious situation which has resulted from aggressive Chinese Communist military actions in the Taiwan [Formosa] Strait area. The President has authorized me to make the following statement:

1. Neither Taiwan nor the islands of Quemoy and Matsu have ever been under the authority of the Chinese Communists. Since the end of the Second World War, a period of over 13 years, they have continuously been under the authority of Free China, that is, the Republic of China.

2. The United States is bound by treaty to help to defend Taiwan from armed attack and the President is authorized by joint resolution of the Congress to employ the armed forces of the United States for the securing and protecting of related positions such as Quemoy and Matsu.

Armed Force Deplored

3. Any attempt on the part of the Chinese Communists now to seize these positions or any of them would be a crude violation of the principles upon which world order is based, namely, that no country should use armed force to seize new territory.

4. The Chinese Communists have, for about two weeks, been subjecting Quemoy to heavy artillery bombardment and, by artillery fire and use of small naval craft, they have been harassing the regular supply of the civilian and military population of the Quemoy, which totals some 125,000 persons. The official Peiping radio repeatedly announces the purpose of these military operations to be to take by armed force Taiwan, as

well as Quemoy and Matsu. In virtually every Peiping broadcast Taiwan and the offshore islands are linked as the objective of what is called the "Chinese People's Liberation Army."

5. Despite, however, what the Chinese Communists say, and so far have done, it is not yet certain that their purpose is in fact to make an all-out effort to conquer by force Taiwan and the offshore islands. Neither is it apparent that such efforts as are being made, or may be made, cannot be contained by the courageous, and purely defensive, efforts of the forces of the Republic of China, with such substantial logistical support as the United States is providing.

6. The joint resolution of Congress, above referred to, includes a finding to the effect that "the possession by friendly governments of the Western Pacific island chain, of which Formosa is a part, is essential to the vital interests of the United States and all friendly nations in and bordering upon the Pacific Ocean." It further authorizes the President to employ the armed forces of the United States for the protection not only of Formosa but for "the securing and protection of such related positions and territories of that area now in friendly hands and the taking of such other measures as he judges to be required or appropriate in insuring the defense of Formosa." In view of the situation outlined in the preceding paragraph, the President has not yet made any finding under that resolution that the employment of the armed forces of the United States is required or appropriate in insuring the defense of Formosa. The Presi-

dent would not, however, hesitate to make such a finding if he judged that the circumstances made this necessary to accomplish the purposes of the joint resolution.

In this connection, we have recognized that the securing and protecting of Quemoy and Matsu have increasingly become related to the defense of Taiwan. This is indeed also recognized by the Chinese Communists. Military dispositions have been made by the United States so that a Presidential determination, if made, would be followed by action both timely and effective.

7. The President and I earnestly hope that the Chinese Communist regime will not again, as in the case of Korea, defy the basic principle upon which world order depends, namely, that armed force should not be used to achieve territorial ambitions. Any such naked use of force would pose an issue far transcending the offshore islands and even the security of Taiwan. It would forecast a widespread use of force in the Far East which would endanger vital free world positions and the security of the United States. Acquiescence therein would threaten peace everywhere. We believe that the civilized world community will never condone overt military conquest as a legitimate instrument of policy.

8. The United States has not, however, abandoned hope that Peiping will stop short of defying the will of mankind for peace. This would not require it to abandon its claims, ill-founded we may deem them to be. . . .

Views of Dean Acheson

The following is excerpted from the text of a statement issued by the former Secretary of State on September 6, as reported in *The New York Times* on September 7.

WE SEEM to be drifting, either dazed or indifferent, toward war with China, a war without friends or allies, and over issues which the Administration has not presented to the people, and which are not worth a single American life. Apparently, also, the President and Secretary Dulles, with or without military advice, will make all the decisions for us, surrounded by secrecy designed to keep everyone guessing.

In this situation we ought to examine with a sharp eye the Eisenhower-Dulles pronouncement from Newport of September 4.

It makes eight points:

Point one. Neither Formosa nor the offshore islands have ever been held by the Chinese Communist Government.

So far as the offshore islands are concerned, this is an irrelevant legal point. The important fact is that always, until the present civil war, the offshore islands—Quemoy, Little Quemoy and Matsu—have been controlled by the same power which controlled the adjacent coast. These, whatever may be said of Formosa, are the coastal islands, as are Long Island, Staten Island and Martha's Vineyard. Their population is minimal. The only purpose of their being held by a force hostile to the mainland government is to block the mainland harbor of Amoy and to offer a threat as an invasion base. Only weakness would lead a mainland government, whatever its nature, to permit this situation to continue. No American interest is served merely by denying them to a regime controlled by the mainland.

Point two. Two statements are made here:

First: That the United States has treaty obligations regarding the defense of Formosa. True, but at the same time that the treaty was before the Senate Secretary Dulles was specific that it had no bearing on the offshore islands. "The position on the offshore islands," he said, "is unaffected by this treaty. Their status is neither promoted by the treaty, nor is it demoted by the treaty." (Press Release 686, December 1, 1954.)

Second: The President is authorized by Congress to employ our armed forces to protect these islands. To be wholly accurate, the language of Congress refers to "the protection of such related . . . territories . . . as he judges to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of Formosa . . ."

Common Sense Question

The question the American people are concerned with is not one of legal authority (which under the Congressional resolution is left to the President's conscience), but rather the question of the common sense of war over these offshore islands.

Point three. The statement says that the seizure of the offshore islands by the mainland government would be a seizure of new territory, and therefore a violation of the principles on which world order is based.

This perverts simple words. The principles on which world order is based (whatever they may be) are not involved at all. Two Chinese forces are contending over Chinese coastal islands which quite obviously

have much more effect on the security of the mainland (as the present state of the port of Amoy demonstrates) than upon that of Formosa (except as a base for invading the mainland.)

Points four and five. These paragraphs state that the Chinese Communists have been bombarding Quemoy, that after their radio has also been threatening an attack on Formosa (as, indeed, it has for eight years), but that neither Chinese Communist intentions to invade nor the capacity of Chiang Kai-shek to defend Quemoy are clear. . . .

Points six, seven and eight. These points are worth close attention. They begin by saying that Congress has declared that Formosa in friendly hands is essential to the vital interest of the United States; that Congress has authorized the President to defend Formosa and ("under certain circumstances") the offshore islands; that while he is not clear yet that these circumstances exist, if he thought they did exist he would defend them; that the defense of Quemoy has become increasingly related to the defense of Formosa; and finally that this action "would forecast a widespread use of force in the Far East" and would "threaten peace everywhere." In conclusion the statement urges the Chinese Communists to renounce force in the Formosa area.

This is the "falling domino" argument which we heard some years ago about Indochina. Here it is that, if the small islands are captured, then Quemoy will be captured. If this occurs, Formosa will fall. Then Southeast Asia, and so on until the United States is imperiled. But now there is an added note. This is furnished by an interpretation of the statement by "a high-ranking American" official as meaning that, if Chiang Kai-shek cannot hold Quemoy, American fighting men will be sent in to do so. That official was Secretary Dulles. In short, the decision seems now to

have been made to defend Quemoy, even though it leads to world war.

Let us see what justifies so horrendous a decision. To do so requires a review of the premises on which this justification for world war is founded. Is Formosa in friendly hands essential to the vital interests of the United States? Congress certainly has been led to say so.

But Congress cannot make something true which is not true. Four times between 1948 and 1950 our highest military authorities concluded that this proposition was not true and did not justify American military action.

But however that may be, it is not involved here. The immediate question here is whether the defense of Quemoy is vital to the defense of

Formosa. The Newport statement does not face this quite frankly. What it says is that "the securing and protecting of Quemoy and Matsu have increasingly become related to the defense of Taiwan [Formosa]." This is a very different thing. What is really meant is that, after the President's message to Congress in 1953 on "unleashing" Chiang Kai-shek, he was unleashed just enough to permit the incredible folly of transporting about a third of his forces to the untenable Quemoy. The obvious goal to be sought is to get them back again. Whatever might at one time have been said for the utility of Quemoy as an advance defense against a weak regime without air or sea power, in the face of present Chinese air and rocket power it can be defended only

by general war with China—as Mr. Dulles, indeed, asserts. The Chinese Nationalists have been quite frank that the coastal islands are held for offensive and not defensive purposes. . . .

The fact of the matter is that our government has most unwisely maneuvered itself, with the help of Chiang Kai-shek, into a situation of which it has lost control. Either the Nationalists or the Communists, or both, can at any moment—this is one of them—precipitate us into war or back down. The attitude of the Administration is that nothing will be done to extricate ourselves from this position during periods of quiet, and that nothing can be done about it in times of crisis. This is an attitude which ought not to be tolerated.



FOREIGN POLICY SPOTLIGHT

France: Dawn or Dusk?

PARIS—Two cities in the world have the quality of immortality which is the mark of greatness in men and monuments: Rome and Paris. But while Rome, in all its imperial magnificence, has an air of repose that makes it seem remote, even aloof, from the turmoil of contemporary events, ancient Paris remains vibrantly alive to modern crises.

The patina of unforgettable beauty that leaves no visitor unmoved is unchanged from Notre Dame and Sainte Chapelle to the Place de la Concorde and Fontainebleau. So it was when World War II came to an end and the forces of the Resistance counted their dead. So it must have been in the bloody days of the French Revolution; in Napoleon's era of war and glory; and in the harsh hours of France's defeat by Prussia in 1871, after the proclamation of the Third Republic, succeeded after Hitler

by the Fourth Republic in 1946.

It was with keen awareness of this continuity in France's history that Charles de Gaulle, a general of the Third Republic whose determination to resist the Nazi conquest made possible France's survival on the side of the allies and the restoration of democracy in 1945, chose to launch his campaign for the referendum on the constitution of the Fifth Republic in the Place de la République.

Here stands the memorial to September 4, 1870, two days after the defeat of Sedan when Napoleon III was taken prisoner by the Prussians. Then, the National Assembly, faced with the possibility of a "Jacobin" coup to set up an authoritarian government, was moved by the eloquence of Léon Gambetta and other Republicans to proclaim the Third Republic. A massive bronze figure of Marianne, represented as a "forte

femme," flanked by statues of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, dominates a drab quarter of Paris, which has traditionally served as a meeting place for Leftist demonstrations. It was with this statue behind him, decorated with streamers in the form of a V, that the premier, erect and vigorous in mufti, made a straightforward, unemotional appeal on September 4 for acceptance of the new constitution on September 28. In keeping with his profound sense of history, he emphasized the place of the four Republics in France's past, the weaknesses of the previous regime the Fifth Republic is to supplant, and the need for all the French people to modernize their institutions if France is to regain its role in world affairs. The only touch of drama in this brief ceremony came when de Gaulle invited the crowd of onlookers, estimated at 100,000, to join him

in singing the *Marseillaise*. And with out musical accompaniment this republican hymn sounded unwontedly nonmilitant.

One had the feeling, in listening to de Gaulle, of a deeply serious man dedicated to the task of France's restoration. But his words were frequently muffled by the sounds of Communist-sponsored demonstrations, restrained in back streets by helmeted police. And even in the crowds, pressed against the barriers surrounding the podium, which had gained admittance by ticket only, there was little evidence of enthusiasm. The mood of the Place de la République, like that of France as a whole, could be summed up in the frequently heard remark: "De Gaulle is the least of all evils." Or, to quote a villager's comment that may make history, "Why ask which road one should take out of the village when we know there is only one road?"

Those who are expected to say "yes" in the referendum—and the best-informed guess on the eve of the poll is that they will constitute 60 percent of the voters*—are either wholeheartedly for de Gaulle or believe that only after the adoption of the new constitution will it be possible for France to tackle its many problems, of which the most pressing and increasingly alarming is the problem of Algeria. Those who have unequivocally made known their determination to vote "no," among them Radical Socialist Pierre Mendès-France and Socialist Edouard Depreux, are convinced that the Fifth Republic will spell the end of democracy in France, and that it is better to continue the national struggle within the familiar political framework than to risk the possibility of an authoritarian government supported by military leaders such as

those who seized power in Algeria last May and who back Jacques Soustelle, now de Gaulle's minister of information.

As always in such a controversy, powerful arguments have been marshaled on both sides. Those who fear that under the constitution of September 28, 1958 France may acquire a government like that of Franco or Salazar, with the political parties so active in the past century reduced to impotence or even eliminated in favor of some corporative assembly representing various economic interests, point to the central role assigned to the president. It is true, some of them say, that de Gaulle, who is expected to be the first incumbent of this greatly strengthened office, may refrain from encroaching on the principles and practices of democracy. But what about his successor? Won't some future president be tempted to exercise the powers entrusted to him, and emasculate parliament?

Plea for Strong Executive

But, say those who in the past have deplored the weaknesses and vacillations of cabinets unwilling or unable to control unruly parliaments, things could not go on like this. France, stymied by political conflicts and cabinet indecision, was losing ground at home and abroad. In the world of the 1950's, amid revolutionary changes in technology, economics and social relations, with the constant threat of nuclear war, a democracy cannot survive unless it has strong, decisive leadership, ready and willing to make quick choices between painfully difficult alternatives. Other democracies, it is argued, also have strong executives who must assume responsibility for policies fraught with grave risks—witness President Eisenhower in Lebanon and Quemoy, or President Truman in Korea.

Both sides agree that, whatever the

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*The actual vote was 4-1 in favor of the constitution.

wording of the constitution—and it is already proving the delight of legal experts—its implementation will depend to a great extent on the new premier. For this role such diverse personalities as the militant Soustelle, a long-time Gaullist, the Socialist Guy Mollet, and Pierre Pflimlin of the Catholic Mouvement Republicain Populaire are regarded as the principal candidates.

If the new premier is a man known for his concern about social reform and the strengthening of individual liberties, then the prevailing anxiety about authoritarianism may be allayed. It is increasingly recognized that democratic France has lagged behind other Western European nations—Britain, Germany, the Low Countries and the Scandinavian nations—in housing, in economic modernization, in measures to advance human welfare. Steps to remedy these deficiencies would enlist the enthusiasm of the young generation, disaffected by futile parliamentary bickering and the resulting political vacuum in which the Communists alone have seemed to show any dynamism. A dynamism of the moderates could conceivably neutralize the influence of the Communists.

The Community

But, most of all, it becomes increasingly clear that dynamic imaginative decisions must be made about

France's remaining overseas territories in Africa. These territories, when they vote "yes" or "no" on September 28, will be expressing their views on Article 76, which gives them an opportunity to decide whether or not they want to remain within the Republic. If a territory says "yes," it will be a member of the Community established by the constitution. In this Community, France's version of the British Commonwealth, there will be only one citizenship, with all citizens equal before the law, whatever their origin, race and religion. The member states will enjoy autonomy, administer themselves, and manage their own affairs "democratically and freely." Although this was not originally made clear, de Gaulle, during his dramatic tour of France's African possessions, explained that territories which had voted "yes" could eventually achieve independence, and he emphasized that they would continue to receive economic aid from France.

If, however, a territory votes "no" on Article 76, then, according to de Gaulle's statements, France will bid it "goodbye and good luck," but will no longer have responsibility for its economic development. The territory will then be on its own. This position reflects a growing feeling in France that the cost of maintaining colonies is burdensome, that the money thus spent might be better spent on devel-

opment at home, and that "decolonization" could benefit France, as it has former colonial nations such as Germany and Italy.

It may well be that this declaration of two-way independence—not only of colonies from France but also of France from unwilling colonies—will strengthen rather than weaken France's African ties, and lay the basis for a new kind of Euro-African community. But both the constitution and de Gaulle are silent on the most burning colonial issue of all: the future of Algeria. The answer will be given only after the referendum, in which the Algerians, both Muslims and French, were invited to participate. Amid mounting Algerian terrorism, both in France and Africa, the main question is, "Can France promise independence to African peoples yet insist on treating Algeria as an integral part of France?"

To this question even de Gaulle's opponents were inclined to agree that only the general has the strength of mind and the prestige to give what will have to be a painful answer for some sector of the Algerian population. And on this answer, more than on any development within France itself, will depend whether the new constitution will herald a new dawn or deepening dusk for the French nation.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

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by Walter H. C. Laves

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